In a decision that will reshape how trial courts across the state handle jury instructions in homicide prosecutions, the New Jersey Supreme Court has clarified when judges are required to charge juries on passion-provocation manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder, sharply limiting when such instructions must be given if the defense does not request them.
The ruling, issued in State v. Owens on January 6, 2026, resolves a split in the Appellate Division and restores the murder conviction of Michael Owens, while also providing new, statewide guidance that trial judges and attorneys will rely on in future criminal cases.
The decision immediately becomes part of New Jersey’s evolving body of criminal and procedural law now shaping legislative and judicial practice statewide, a development closely tracked in Sunset Daily’s continuing coverage of New Jersey legislation and court policy.
The case centered on whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct jurors on passion-provocation manslaughter during Owens’ murder trial.
Owens was convicted by a jury of murder, possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, and aggravated assault. According to the trial record, the incident unfolded after Owens discovered that another man had contacted his girlfriend by phone. Prosecutors said Owens became enraged, physically assaulted his girlfriend by choking her, took her cellphone, and left.
Approximately forty-five minutes later, Owens used information found on the phone to locate and confront a man from whom his girlfriend regularly purchased heroin. That man, identified as Gonzalez, was shot and killed.
At trial, Owens did not ask the court to instruct the jury on passion-provocation manslaughter. Instead, defense counsel affirmatively took the position that no lesser-included offenses should be submitted to the jury.
After his conviction, Owens appealed, arguing that the trial court should nevertheless have instructed jurors on passion-provocation manslaughter and that the aggravated assault charge involving his girlfriend should have been separated from the homicide case. He also challenged his sentence.
A majority of the Appellate Division initially sided with Owens. The panel ruled that the trial judge should have charged the jury on passion-provocation manslaughter even though the defense had not requested it. The majority reasoned that when evidence clearly indicates the appropriateness of a lesser-included offense, a judge must provide the instruction on the court’s own initiative, and that such a need must effectively “jump off the page.”
The panel further concluded that trial judges must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant when deciding whether to instruct on passion-provocation manslaughter. Based on that approach, the majority vacated Owens’ murder conviction and his conviction for possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose.
The panel also faulted the trial court for allowing the jury to hear evidence related to the aggravated assault against Owens’ girlfriend, concluding that the evidence should have been sanitized and that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.
A sharply worded dissent from Appellate Division Judge Thomas Gilson, however, rejected each of those conclusions.
Judge Gilson wrote that the record did not support a passion-provocation manslaughter charge because Gonzalez did not provoke Owens, and because the lapse of time between the argument with Owens’ girlfriend and the shooting gave Owens ample opportunity to cool off.
He further concluded that there was no plain error in the jury instructions, that the aggravated assault evidence was not unfairly prejudicial, and that the trial court acted well within its discretion by allowing the jury to hear that evidence in the context of the related homicide charges.
Judge Gilson would have affirmed Owens’ convictions in full.
Because of that dissent, the State appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court as of right.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Appellate Division.
In a per curiam opinion, the Court reinstated Owens’ convictions for murder and possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and sent the case back to the Appellate Division solely for review of Owens’ sentencing arguments.
The justices adopted Judge Gilson’s reasoning in its entirety.
“We reverse the judgment of the Superior Court, Appellate Division substantially for the reasons stated in Judge Gilson’s thoughtful dissenting opinion,” the Court wrote.
Beyond restoring the convictions, the Court used the case to clarify a critical and frequently litigated issue in criminal trials: when judges must instruct juries on passion-provocation manslaughter without a request from the defense.
The Court drew a firm distinction between two very different procedural situations.
When a defendant affirmatively requests a passion-provocation manslaughter instruction, trial courts must evaluate the evidence under the well-established standard that views the record in the light most favorable to the defendant.
However, when a defendant does not request the instruction — or, as in Owens’ case, explicitly tells the court that no lesser-included offenses should be charged — a far more demanding standard applies on appeal.
In those circumstances, appellate courts may reverse only if the evidence in the record clearly indicates that the instruction was required, meaning that the factual basis for the charge must be unmistakable and “jump off the page.”
The Court emphasized that the more defendant-friendly evidentiary standard does not apply when the issue is raised for the first time on appeal as plain error.
By drawing this bright procedural line, the Supreme Court signaled that strategic decisions made by defense counsel at trial carry real consequences and that appellate courts should not retroactively impose lesser-included offenses when the defense has consciously chosen an all-or-nothing trial strategy.
The ruling also reinforces the legal elements required to support a passion-provocation manslaughter charge, including proof of adequate provocation, an actual loss of self-control, and the absence of sufficient time for a reasonable person to cool off before committing the killing.
In Owens’ case, the Court agreed that the record did not demonstrate provocation by the victim and that the passage of time between the initial confrontation and the fatal shooting undermined any claim of heat-of-passion conduct.
Equally significant is the Court’s treatment of the aggravated assault evidence involving Owens’ girlfriend.
By adopting the dissent, the justices rejected the argument that the jury should have been shielded from that evidence. The Court accepted that the assault was directly relevant to understanding the sequence of events leading to the homicide and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice.
For prosecutors, the decision provides stronger authority to present connected acts that form part of a continuous narrative, even when those acts involve separate criminal charges.
For defense attorneys, the ruling underscores the importance of deliberate trial-level decisions concerning lesser-included offenses and the risks associated with declining those charges in hopes of securing an outright acquittal.
Across New Jersey’s trial courts, the impact of State v. Owens is expected to be immediate. Judges now have clear direction that they are not required to override defense strategy by injecting passion-provocation manslaughter into a case unless the evidentiary record plainly demands it.
The ruling narrows the path for defendants seeking reversals based on unrequested jury charges and provides a more predictable framework for courts evaluating homicide cases involving claims of emotional or situational provocation.
As criminal prosecutions continue to test the boundaries of jury instruction law, the Supreme Court’s decision in Owens stands as one of the most consequential clarifications in recent years, redefining how passion-provocation manslaughter fits into New Jersey’s modern criminal trial practice.
